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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , : Case No. 860031 
- v - : 
JOHN R. REMINGTON, i Category No. 2 
Defendant -Appe l lant . : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s are p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s appea l : 
1. Did defendant preserve for appeal the issue he 
raises regarding the tr ial court's refusal to give his requested 
eyewitness identif ication instruction? 
2 . Was there s u f f i c i e n t ev idence t o support 
d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n of aggravated robbery? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant , John R. Remington, was charged wi th 
aggravated robbery , a f i r s t degree f e l o n y , under UTAH CODE ANN. § 
7 6 - 6 - 3 0 2 (1978) (amended 1 9 8 6 ) , p o s s e s s i o n of a dangerous weapon 
by a r e s t r i c t e d p e r s o n , a second degree f e l o n y , under UTAH CODE 
ANN. S 7 6 - 1 0 - 5 0 3 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , and being a h a b i t u a l c r imina l under UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 7 6 - 8 - 1 0 0 2 (1978) (R. 2 0 - 2 1 ) . 
A jury found him g u i l t y of the f i r s t two o f f e n s e s (R. 
1 0 4 - 0 5 ) . In a s e p a r a t e p r o c e e d i n g , t h e cour t r u l e d t h a t he was a 
h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l (R. 1 3 0 ) . The court then s e n t e n c e d him t o t h e 
Utah S t a t e Pr i son for c o n s e c u t i v e s e n t e n c e s of f i v e y e a r s t o 
l i f e , one t o f i f t e e n y e a r s , and f i v e y e a r s t o l i f e for aggravated 
robbery, possess ion of a dangerous weapon, and being a habitual 
cr iminal , with two one-year enhancements for use of a firearm (R. 
130-35)• I t a l s o ordered defendant t o pay r e s t i t u t i o n in the 
amount of $5,240.54 (R. 134) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State presented the fol lowing re levant evidence at 
t r i a l . On August 17, 1985 sometime between 2:00 and 2:30 p.m., 
defendant and a co-defendant, Stephen John Kal i sz , arrived at a 
used car l o t in S a l t Lake City. After defendant spoke with the 
owner of the l o t , defendant and Kalisz took a black 1978 Monte 
Carlo for a t e s t - d r i v e , leaving the truck that they had arrived 
in behind. When the car was not returned within the a l l o t t e d 
time, the l o t owner searched d e f e n d a n t s and Kalisz 1 s truck and 
found a Utah State Prison pass bearing defendant's p ic ture and 
name. After contacting the prison, he ca l l ed the po l i ce (R. 164-
69 ) . 
A po l i ce o f f i cer had only been a t the car l o t a short 
time when the Monte Carlo was returned by Kalisz at between 5:00 
and 5:45 p.m. When questioned about defendant's whereabouts, 
Kalisz explained that he had taken defendant to the hosp i ta l 
because the l a t t e r had suffered an appendic i t i s at tack. Before 
Kalisz returned, the po l i ce o f f i c e r had received a radio dispatch 
which indicated that po l i ce were looking for a black Monte Carlo 
that had slammed in to a curb while apparently f l e e i n g from the 
scene of a robbery that had j u s t occurred a t the Brickyard Plaza 
shopping center in S a l t Lake City . The o f f i c e r and l o t owner 
not iced a scuff mark (cons i s tent with that caused by h i t t i n g a 
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curb) on the Monte Carlo driven by Kalisz and that the price 
stickers on the car appeared to have been removed and then 
replaced during the time that the car had been away. However, a 
search of the car uncovered no weapons or evidence of a robbery 
(R. 170-74, 275-79, 282, 296-97, 301-02). 
Shortly before Kalisz returned to the car lot, a clerk 
in a jewelry store at Brickyard Plaza, Malinda Engelhardt, 
observed defendant in her store. He did not look at any of the 
merchandise, but merely stood and looked out the window. When 
defendant left, he walked in the direction of Cruser Jewelry 
which was a short distance away (R. 198-200, 210, 214). 
Several minutes later, a man entered Cruser jewelry, 
pointed a gun at Reed Cruser (the store owner), forced him to lie 
down on the floor, swept jewelry and cash from display cases and 
a safe into a large plastic bag, and fled the scene. The robber 
was present for three to five minutes. Cruser recognized the man 
as a person who had been in the store earlier that day, but was 
able to view his face for only part of the time that he was in 
the store for the robbery (R. 224-28, 236-37, 264). 
After receiving a report of the incident from Cruser, 
the police took him to the car lot where Kalisz was now in 
custody. There, Cruser indicated that he thought Kalisz, 
although dressed differently, was the robber.1 However, when 
presented with a photo lineup several days later, Cruser selected 
1 There is a discrepancy in the evidence on this point. Although 
Cruser testified that he was able to identify Kalisz, the 
accompanying police officer testified that Cruser could not make 
that identification (R. 283-84). 
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a p ic ture of defendant ( S t a t e ' s Exhibit #7) and i d e n t i f i e d him as 
the robber. F ina l l y , a t t r i a l Cruser reaffirmed h i s b e l i e f that 
S t a t e ' s Exhibit #7 was a photograph of the man who robbed him, 
but made an in-court i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of Kalisz and further s ta ted 
that he did not think defendant was the man2 (R. 229, 236, 244-
46, 257 ) . 
The po l i ce a l s o showed Ms. Engelhardt the photo l ineup. 
She p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d S t a t e ' s Exhibit #7 as the person she 
had seen in her s tore the day of the robbery. At t r i a l , she 
again i d e n t i f i e d defendant as that person (R. 202-04) . 
Upon h i s arr ival back a t the prison in the evening of 
August 17, defendant was arrested and a gold Bulova watch se i zed 
from h i s person. Although the watch did not have any ident i fy ing 
marks that conc lus ive ly connected i t with Cruser Jewelry, i t was 
ident i ca l to watches s t o l e n from the s tore . However, i t could 
not be e s t a b l i s h e d whether or not defendant had l e f t the prison 
that day wearing such a watch (R. 230-35, 268-70 , 304-06, 311-
1 2 ) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because defendant did not except to the t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
refusal to g ive h i s requested eyewitness i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
2 At t r i a l , the S t a t e ' s counsel and defense counsel did not 
always make per fec t ly c lear which defendant they were referr ing 
to when asking wi tnesses to make i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s . However, i t 
appears that in these ins tances Mr. Garcia was general ly 
referring t o h i s c l i e n t , Kal i sz , and Ms. Harrold to her c l i e n t , 
defendant. As for the prosecutor, he appears to have 
d i s t inguished between defendant and Kalisz by referring t o t h e i r 
respec t ive at torneys and asking the witness to i d e n t i f y the 
person s i t t i n g next to each attorney (presumably, defendant s a t 
next to Ms. Harrold and Kalisz sat next to Mr. Garcia) . 
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instruction, he is precluded from challenging that ruling on 
appeal. 
Although the evidence presented by the State at t r i a l 
was not overwhelming, under the relevant standards of review, 
t h i s Court should hold that there was s u f f i c i e n t evidence to 
support defendant's convict ion of aggravated robbery. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT DID NOT EXCEPT TO THE TRIAL COURT'S 
REFUSAL TO GIVE HIS REQUESTED EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION INSTRUCTION; THEREFORE, HE 
WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO THAT RULING FOR 
PURPOSES OF APPEAL. 
At the c lose of t r i a l , defendant requested a cautionary 
eyewitness i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ins truct ion patterned after the one 
recommended in United Sta tes v. T e l f a i r e , 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 
1972) (R. 65-66) . The t r i a l court refused to give the 
instruction (R. 66). On appeal, defendant argues that this was 
revers ib le error. However, because the record does not contain 
an exception by defendant t o the lower cour t ' s refusal to give 
the requested i n s t r u c t i o n , t h i s Court should not address h i s 
assignment of error. As s ta ted in State v. Evans, 668 P.2d 566 
(Utah 1983)5 
Generally, for a party to be in a pos i t i on 
to complain of the t r i a l court ' s f a i l u r e to 
give an i n s t r u c t i o n , he must f i r s t propose 
the ins truc t ion and then take exception to 
the court 1 s refusal to give i t . 
668 P.2d at 568 ( c i t a t i o n omitted) . See a l so S ta te v. Noren, 704 
P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1985); Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) (UTAH CODE ANN. 
S 77-35-19 (c) (1982)) . Nothing suggests that manifest i n j u s t i c e 
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would occur if the alleged instructional error is not reviewed by 
the Court due to waiver. ££. State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 81 
(Utah 1983). 
POINT II 
ALTHOUGH NOT OVERWHELMING, SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED BY THE STATE TO 
SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. 
When considering a challenge to the su f f i c i ency of the 
evidence, t h i s Court has applied the fo l lowing standard of 
review: 
This Court will not lightly overturn the 
findings of a jury. We must view the 
evidence properly presented at trial in 
the light most favorable to the juryfs 
verdict, and will only interfere when the 
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial 
that a reasonable man could not possibly 
have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable 
doubt. We also view in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict those 
facts which can be reasonably inferred 
from the evidence presented to it. 
State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982) (citations 
omitted). As noted in State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985): 
In reviewing the conviction, we do not 
substitute our judgment for that of the 
jury. "It is the exclusive function of 
the jury to weigh the evidence and to 
determine the credibility of the 
witnesses . . . ." State v. Lamm, Utah 
606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980); accord State v. 
Linden, Utah 547 P.2d 1264, 1366 (1983). 
So long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings 
of all the requisite elements of the crime 
can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. 
Id. at 345 (citation omitted). Ancj, even if the Court views the 
evidence as less than wholly conclusive, or if contradictory 
evidence or conflicting inferences exist, the verdict should be 
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upheld. State v. Howell. 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982). In shor t , 
•on conflicting evidence the Court i s obliged to accept the 
version of the facts which supports the v e r d i c t . " State v. 
Isaacson, 704 P.2d 555f 556 (Utah 1985) (c i t ing Sta te v. Howell, 
649 P.2d a t 93) . F inal ly , circumstantial evidence alone may be 
competent to es tab l i sh the gu i l t of the accused. S ta te v. 
Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1982). 
Defendant does not dispute tha t an aggravated robbery 
occurred a t Cruser Jewelry on August 17, 1985; he simply contends 
that the S t a t e ' s evidence was insuf f ic ien t to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt tha t he was the perpetrator of the crime. 
Although the evidence presented by the S ta te a t t r i a l was not 
overwhelming, the jury s t i l l could have reasonably concluded t h a t 
defendant was gui l ty of aggravated robbery. 
The testimony of Ms. Engelhardt firmly placed defendant 
a t the Brickyard Plaza short ly before the robbery at Cruser 
Jewelry. Although Mr. Cruser1s i den t i f i ca t i on testimony was 
incons is tent as i t re la ted to defendant, when shown a photo 
l ineup several days af ter the incident he did ind ica te to the 
police that defendant was the robber.3 The period of defendant 's 
possession of the black Monte Carlo obtained from the used car 
l o t — the type of vehicle which was seen hurr iedly leaving the 
scene of the crime — coincided with the time the robbery was 
3 Defendant's reference to Cruser fs testimony a t preliminary 
hearing should not be considered. No ce r t i f i ed t r ansc r ip t of the 
preliminary hearing has been made a, par t of the record on appeal. 
Thus, t h i s Court has nothing to review. See S ta te v. Lairby, 699 
P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah 1984); S ta te v. Wulffenstein, 647 P.2d 289, 
293 (Utah 1982), c e r t , denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983). 
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committed. When Kalisz returned the Monte Carlo t o the l o t , he 
offered an explanation for defendant's absence that the jury 
could reasonably have concluded was f a l s e , given that defendant 
returned to the prison short ly thereaf ter ( i . e . , i f defendant had 
ac tua l ly suffered an appendic i t i s at tack, i t was not l i k e l y that 
he would have been re leased from the hospi ta l that same day). 
That the price s t i c k e r s on the car appeared to have been removed 
and replaced could have reasonably given r i s e to a jury inference 
that defendant had tampered with the s t i c k e r s in order to make 
h i s v e h i c l e l e s s i d e n t i f i a b l e in the course of committing a 
robbery. F ina l ly , a search of defendant upon h i s return t o the 
prison uncovered a brand new watch i d e n t i c a l to those s t o l e n from 
the jewelry s t o r e . This evidence, although in many respects 
c i rcumstant ia l , supports the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t . 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's 
convict ions should be affirmed. /L^^^ 
RESPECTFULLY submitted t h i s n day of February, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON V 
Ass i s tan t Attorney General 
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